

THE MOSCOW OLYMPICS, 1980

Competing in the context of the Cold War and state dirigisme

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At the seventy-fifth meeting of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) held in October 1974, the decision was made to select Moscow as the host city of the XXII Summer Olympic Games in 1980 (almost immediately the media reduced the full name down to Olympics-80). This event was preceded by a long history of relations between the USSR and the IOC, which emerged during the post-World War II period, when in the spring of 1951, the USSR became a member of the Olympic Movement. From 1952, the Soviet national team regularly took part in the Olympic Games.

It is also worth noting that by 1974, the significance of sports in the USSR had undergone considerable change. The role given to sports now went beyond being a tool of hegemonic control employed to address internal challenges (such as sustaining the health and working capacity of the population, distracting the public from problems, and enhancing discipline) to become a Cold War weapon. The militaristic language of Soviet sport in the 1920s to the 1930s continued into this new historical context (O'Mahony 2006).

For the USSR, the Moscow 1980 Olympic Games became the first event of such scale in Soviet history. Many years of preparation, mass media coverage, hundreds of thousands of visitors, unprecedented drama – all of these undoubtedly connect the Moscow Olympic Games to mega-events more generally (Roche 2000). More specifically, however, the Moscow Games provide an opportunity to examine sport mega-events in the context of the Cold War and the late Soviet period.

This chapter analyses the preparations for and the results of the Moscow 1980 Olympic Games. Empirical materials include official documents that were only declassified in recent years and partially published material such as resolutions of the Central Committee and reports and memoranda of the bodies involved in arranging the Olympic Games that offer substantial data for an analysis of this sort (Pyat' kolets 2011). The chapter focuses on certain issues related to preparing for and holding the Olympic Games in the light of international problems, boycott and the consequences of the event for the host country.

The historical context

The importance of the Moscow Olympic Games for the Soviet regime and the event's influence on the external and internal politics of the USSR are hard to assess without understanding

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the historical context. James Riordan's (1977) work provides a basis for identifying specific periods in the development of Soviet sport. The period of 'Soviet physical culture and sports' (1917–1928) was characterized by criticism of bourgeois sports and a quest for alternatives, by the principle of proletarian internationalism in international contacts, and by debates about the role of sports in creating 'the new Soviet person'. The period of the centralization of control over sport (1929–1938) was a time when sport associations were subordinated to the country's party leadership, and international contacts with clubs and sport associations of workers were established. The next is the war period (1939–1945) when sports functioned as a way of unifying the people and sustaining and demonstrating the soldierly spirit, then the Cold War period (1946–1991), when the USSR pursued international recognition, exported the Soviet sport model, and joined international sport organizations (becoming a member of thirty international sport organizations by 1958, and as many as forty-two by 1973). During this period, sport functioned as part of large-scale opposition to capitalist countries, with the main point of tension being between the USSR and the USA. During the period after 1991, it experienced the transition from socialist to market sport economics, whilst retaining some elements of the previous organizational structure.

Officially, sport was presented in the USSR as a branch of the public field which was not dependent on politics. This official position followed the Marxist approach to sport as being akin to religion – a means of subordination, sustaining class divisions and shaping the system of domination in capitalist society. In the early Soviet period, this attitude to sport was enshrined in practice. By the end of the 1920s there were heated discussions of the bourgeois nature of competitive sports alongside the emergence of ideas about sport for all, with its emphasis on participation rather than competition and audience appeal. Sport was considered to be an important means of emancipation, especially for women, and a means by which to produce a 'new Soviet person'. These were the aspects of large-scale involvement in the educative function of sport that were manifest in the multiple physical training movements and volunteer sport associations that emerged during that period (Guttmann 1988; O'Mahony 2006; Dubin 2006).

In the early post-revolution years, the centralized system of sport activities for Soviet citizens had not yet been established. Indeed, during the first decade, Konsomol, trade unions, and educational and military committees handled the formation of different sport associations, events and norms. However, by the beginning of the 1930s, sport management underwent a transformation with the control of sport becoming centralized and international connections with workers' sport clubs and associations being established.

The value of the USSR's participation in the Olympic Movement before World War II was constantly in doubt. In 1920, Vsevoluch (the organization in charge of the system of the General Military Training from 1918 until 1923) intended to delegate Soviet sportsmen to the Antwerp Olympic Games, but was refused permission under the pretext of the Soviet powers refusing to accept the liabilities of the Russian Empire. In 1924, the Organising Committee of the Paris Olympic Games delivered an invitation to Soviet sportsmen through the agency of the French Workers' Sport and Gymnastic Union. However, the Soviet government refused to participate and protested against German athletes being banned from the Games (Pyat' kolets 2011: 6).

The fact that the USSR did not attempt to regain IOC recognition during the inter-war period points to a lack of government interest in participating in the Olympic Movement. During the years preceding World War II, Soviet sport organizations were searching instead for contacts with sport associations with similar proletarian origins as opposed to international organizations that they regarded as bourgeois and hostile.

Only in April 1951 was the Olympic Committee of the USSR (currently the Russian Olympic Committee) established. The following month, at the forty-sixth IOC session, the USSR was admitted to IOC membership. When discussing the USSR's request to join, issues on the agenda included the amateur status of Soviet athletes (this was considered to be more nominal than actual) and the independence of the USSR Olympic Committee from the Communist Party and government. Nevertheless, according to Riordan, at that time the IOC was facing many more problems due to the changed geopolitical situation after World War II, and the USSR was admitted in spite of evident non-compliance with admission conditions (Guttmann 1988; Demeter 2005; Riordan 1977).

As early as 1956, the Sportkomitet of the USSR (an official abbreviation of the Physical Culture and Sports Committee attached to the Council of Ministers of the USSR) submitted a bid to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU Central Committee) to host the 1964 Summer Olympic Games in Moscow. The idea of the proposal was initially approved, but in the course of detailed consideration and examination of the experience of other host countries as well as of IOC requirements, it became clear that it would not be possible to realize this in the near years. The lack of suitable sport facilities, low service standards and poor living conditions (hotels, restaurants, transport), apprehensions that Soviet citizens were not ready to resist the impact of the Western guests and, arguably, most important of all, an unwillingness to have contact with countries with which the USSR had no diplomatic relations, set back the fulfillment of the idea of 'the first Socialist Olympic Games' for years. Sportkomitet re-submitted its bid in 1963 and in 1965 for the 1968 and 1972 Olympic Games (respectively), but found no support from the CPSU Central Committee. Prozumenshukov and other sports historians explain these decisions with reference to the personality of Nikita Khrushchev, who had little interest in sport. However, one cannot ignore internal problems and issues of foreign policy relations that played their roles as important deterrents (Pyat' kolets 2011: 15; Peppard and Riordan 1993).

When Leonid Brezhnev assumed the post of Secretary General, the Central Committee revisited the idea of holding the Summer Olympics in Moscow. A bid to host the 1976 Games was developed and submitted, but, despite optimism amongst the USSR's political elite, the bid lost during the final round of voting. The next bid was prepared more thoroughly by USSR representatives and was submitted nine years prior to the 1980 Games. Active work had been conducted with IOC members, foreign mass media and representatives of international sport associations. All of this helped to result in the desired outcome in February 1975, when the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee 'Of Preparations for the XXII Summer Olympic Games in Moscow' was approved by the Organizing Committees for the Olympic Games and large-scale preparations for the event began.

According to documents relating to preparations for the 1980 Olympics, from the very beginning every element of the process, including construction, propaganda, counter-propaganda, the allocation of funds in rubles and foreign currency, international contacts and contracts, was strictly controlled at the level of the CPSU Central Committee. This is clear evidence of a state dirigisme strategy for hosting international events in the USSR, which remains an issue in contemporary Russia (Muller 2011).

A turning point in the preparations for the Games came in the winter of 1979/80, when the tensions intrinsic to the Cold War were exacerbated after Soviet troops were sent to Afghanistan and the international situation changed significantly. This is why it is important to see the history of preparations for the 1980 Olympic Games chronologically, i.e. before and after the crisis of 1979/80.

The ideological context

Ideology was undoubtedly one of the most important features of the Moscow Olympic Games from the moment that the bid was submitted to the IOC in 1971. The Olympic Games were planned as an event that would establish a basis upon which to propagandize the Soviet way of life and belief system both in countries of the socialist bloc and in capitalist countries. In addition, a purportedly non-political headline event in the country fully fitted in with the general pattern of Soviet achievements, including space exploration and providing assistance to developing countries. By hosting a mega-event such as the Olympic Games, the USSR could considerably improve its international image on the one hand, and enhance patriotic feelings inside the country on the other.

Much effort was made to smooth over differences in both international and domestic politics. One significant issue which the Soviet leadership faced was the need to follow the IOC requirement to invite all recognized representatives of the Olympic Movement to the Olympic Games. The problem was that the USSR had strained relations with some countries and no diplomatic relations with others. A series of such issues can be traced in the published documents on the 1980 Olympic Games. For example, the report of the Organizing Committee of the 1980 Olympic Games, in disclosing analysis of Montreal's Olympic Games experience, states that it is important to summarize the materials and 'develop suggestions on awareness-raising campaigns and work with journalists' to avoid negative views in the press and 'moral damage' to the country (Pyat' kolets 2011: 114).

The 'Two Chinas' issue was also repeatedly mentioned in Organizing Committee memos and reports. On the one hand, the National Olympic Committee (NOC) of Taiwan was officially recognized by the IOC under the name of Republic of China, and the USSR was bound to invite them to take part in the Moscow Games. On the other hand, taking into account tensions in relations with the People's Republic of China and the fact that the PRC was not recognized by the IOC and did not participate in the Olympic Movement, Beijing was expected to react strongly should the Soviet Organizing Committee comply with IOC requirements. Having solicited the support of Lord Killanin, the IOC President, and representatives of socialist countries in the IOC, the Soviet representatives successfully came up with proposals to resolve the issue. As a result, in 1979, the eighty-first IOC session adopted the resolution of acknowledging the NOCs of both the PRC and Taiwan, to be followed by working out the issues of names, flags and anthems (Pyat' kolets 2011: 157). This middle ground was not fully satisfactory to all stakeholders, but at least resulted in the issue being officially resolved.

One more concern was the requirement to invite sport delegations, journalists and tourists from countries with which the USSR did not maintain relations for a variety of reasons. Until the middle of 1977, official reports consistently referred to the fact that, during IOC meetings and press conferences, the question of guaranteed participation of all national sport teams recognized by the IOC was regularly raised. The USSR representatives had to constantly confirm the readiness of the country's leadership to fulfil their obligations and invite all recognized members to take part in the Olympic Games. As early as September 1977, the CPSU Central Committee issued the decree that allowed the Organizing Committee to 'maintain required contacts with all IOC members and national Olympic Committees recognized by the IOC', to invite Olympic attachés of these countries to the USSR whilst minimizing contact with the NOCs of Taiwan, Chile and South Korea, as well as access to the country for their officials, journalists and tourists during the Olympic Games (Pyat' kolets 2011: 157). At the same time, Organizing Committee representatives constantly met

with counterparts from socialist countries (the PRC, North Korea, East Germany, etc.) to persuade these allies that unwanted contact with the NOCs of certain countries was merely a matter of protocol and did not affect the USSR's official position regarding these countries in any way.

The Organizing Committee of the 1980 Olympic Games, the KGB (Committee for State Security) and the Press Agency 'Novosti' ('News') were continuously monitoring the Western press to discern changes in the attitude of capitalist countries towards the 1980 Olympic Games. Regular briefing notes indicate the main elements of criticism of the USSR and the Moscow Olympic Games: human rights violations, unsatisfactory level of services, censorship, KGB officers in Sportkomitet, Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games, and among athletes, passport regulations. Similar reports were submitted to the Central Committee on an incredibly regular basis, but initially the strongest apprehensions concerned 'slandorous' radio stations, Radio Free Europe and Europe, that were accredited for the Innsbruck and Montreal Olympic Games. Huge efforts were made to amend the media accreditation procedures of the IOC to avoid the need to invite these radio stations to Moscow. Moreover, as early as the summer of 1978, notes of the KGB and Novosti Press Agency were changed to include more detailed information about anti-Soviet organizations that were beginning to directly oppose the Moscow Olympic Games taking place. The rhetoric of these reports, especially those of the KGB, changed considerably – it began simply with such phrases as 'hostile intelligence agencies', 'enemy propaganda' and 'slandorous organizations of the enemy'. While initially the KGB let it be known that it was possible that members of anti-Soviet organisations (e.g. the National Alliance of Russian Solidarists) would attempt to be included in national delegations seeking to disrupt Olympic Games ceremonies, perform acts of terrorism, distribute anti-Soviet literature (Pyat' kolets 2011: 177), later they provided more detailed information about anti-Soviet operations that were already in progress. It becomes clear from these reports that even by the summer of 1978, long before Soviet troops went into Afghanistan, calls to boycott or move the 1980 Olympic Games from Moscow to another place had been articulated. The main reason related to human rights violations in the USSR. By summer 1979, the KGB reports suggested that, in many countries of Western Europe, different groups, sometimes linked to local parliaments, were openly taking a stand against holding the Olympic Games in Moscow (Pyat' kolets 2011: 235).

In response, the USSR adopted a variety of counter-propaganda measures including negotiating the establishment of information centres in Western countries to disseminate information about preparations for the 1980 Olympic Games. For example, a memo from the USSR embassy in the UK dated October 1976 refers to a meeting with K. Morgan, a 'famous press and advertising specialist', who suggested that a London Information Centre for the Moscow Olympic Games should be established to maintain direct liaison with Moscow. The suggestion caught the interest of the Soviet leadership not least because after the Olympic Games, information networks of this type could be used to achieve propaganda tasks abroad (Pyat' kolets 2011: 130–131). As criticism of the USSR grew, the country's leadership paid ever more attention to propaganda. Thus, it follows from a report of the Organizing Committee for the 1980 Olympic Games as of August 1978 that the awareness of the need for propaganda should consist of several dimensions: holding regular press conferences (38 were held) and meetings (800 held) with journalists, distributing Olimpiada-80 and Olimpiyskaya Panorama magazines and books, producing TV films of preparations for the Olympic Games in 30 countries, and arranging exhibitions. At the same time, the Organizing Committee pointed to the fact that related agencies did not fulfil the book publishing plans and failed to produce enough films,

while international cultural and economic ties could have been used more intensively for propaganda purposes (Pyat' kolets 2011: 304).

Simultaneously, security measures were developed for Moscow, as well as for Tallinn, Leningrad, Kiev and Minsk, where certain Olympic Games competitions were to be held. In this context, 'safety' had a double meaning: on the one hand, it meant ensuring proper order and the personal safety of all participants during the Olympic Games, but on the other hand, 'ideological' safety was implied. While the first task was addressed by drawing on the experience of the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada and other countries that had already hosted similar mega-events, the second required new initiatives.

First, it was decided to end the academic year in Moscow universities and institutes earlier than usual to clear hostels and make sure that students left Moscow. Soviet students were sent to pass practical training sessions outside the city, while foreign students were provided with rest time in recreation and holiday centres at public expense. In addition, a resolution of the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee dated 24 July 1979, introduced temporary measures restricting entry to Moscow during the 1980 Olympic Games and sending Moscow citizens to construction force units, sport/pioneer camps, and other recreation facilities (Pyat' kolets 2011: 351–353). This is how Soviet citizens were to be safeguarded from the 'pernicious influence of the Western world'. Other resolutions of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs dealt with cleansing Moscow of dangerous criminals and mentally affected people who could potentially interfere with the Games (Pyat' kolets 2011: 635–637). Finally, all foreigners who entered the jurisdiction of the USSR were subject to strict security screening procedures and were escorted within the country.

During the Olympic Games, the Committee of Foreign Tourism issued a large number of reports, which contained a list of positive assessments from Olympiad members of official delegations and foreign tourists. These documents were often given the names of the respondents, and include quotations from conversations with them. These documents show that foreign visitors to Moscow Olympics were escorted not only to ensure the safety standards but also to collect information.

The economic context

Another important aspect of preparing for and holding the Moscow Olympic Games was the financial domain. Until 1984, the Olympic Games had little commercial significance; no profit was usually made as a result of hosting the event. However, some commercial practices to cover expenses had emerged. This consisted initially of selling broadcasting rights, with 50 per cent of the profits being transferred to the IOC. The production and sale of souvenir items, stamps, coins and lottery tickets also brought some income. Furthermore, since the Rome Olympic Games in 1960, sports equipment could be supplied for free in exchange for providing the providing companies with the 'official supplier' and 'official sponsor' status. The USSR tried to use all of these mechanisms to the maximum extent.

From 1971, Soviet sport managers started to gather and analyse information about how the Olympic Games had been prepared for and held in other countries. After Moscow had been approved as the host city, members of the Organizing Committee collected as much information as possible about the Olympic Games in Munich, Montreal and Innsbruck. According to reports of Organizing Committee delegates, in addition to entering into negotiations with foreign colleagues, they also met with representatives of TV companies, firms and companies that showed an interest in signing contracts with the Organizing Committee. The report of the Montreal trip in 1976 refers to Canadian colleagues' experience of issuing coins, holding

a lottery, arranging medical services and so on. While in Canada, committee members also had negotiations with CBS and Coca Cola, and signed a contract with the French affiliate of Adidas. Proposals from IBM, Siemens and Phillips to supply hardware and software are also mentioned. Thus, a year before the 1980 Olympic Games, contracts for broadcasting rights had been signed with world-leading TV companies, and contracts were concluded with 54 foreign corporations, official suppliers and sponsors (Pyat' kolets 2011: 281, 307). Every proposal had to be discussed and approved by the CPSU Central Committee, while the documents themselves were assigned 'secret' status. It is evident that the 1980 Olympic Games had set unprecedented conditions for goods from capitalistic countries to penetrate beyond the 'iron curtain'.

The Organizing Committee also submitted requests for an allocation of foreign currency funds in order to buy press centre equipment, Mercedes cars for official entertainment purposes, and business trip expenses (Pyat' kolets 2011: 59, 281, 286–287). In addition, it took charge of the production and sale of souvenir products, gold and silver Olympic coins, and holding Sportfoto and Sprint international lotteries (the latter being sold in the countries of the socialist bloc, giving them status of the first ever designated international lotteries).

For many years, the total budget of the Moscow Olympic Games was not disclosed. However, the sum could have been estimated at least approximately from archival documents (although they contain only individual amounts allocated to finance different needs, such as the construction of sport facilities, building roads, and putting on cultural programmes). The important point is that the USSR agreed to sign a wide range of contracts with Western companies in order to minimize expenses associated with organizing the Olympic Games, thereby extending international economic cooperation.

What attracted attention in reports of Olympic Games progress was that the spending of budget funds was controlled, and in every case when work provided for in the plan was not carried out on time, the budget was not implemented to the full extent. This dealt with Olympic Games facilities construction, publication of awareness-building and propaganda materials, and many other aspects of preparation. Thus, in 1978–1979, there were many reports of delays in the construction of the Olympic Games facilities (stadia, hotels, restaurants, airports), but requests for additional financing were rarely submitted. Factors mentioned in relation to delays included project complexity, lack of personnel and equipment, late supplies or the low quality of construction materials, the large scale of work and the inadequate capacity of construction organizations. Occasionally, difficulties with implementing a certain project occurred, and requests to amend the projects were submitted to the Central Committee (Pyat' kolets 2011: 73, 77, 83, 304). All in all, the plan was to build or reconstruct 99 Olympic Games facilities, with 76 of them being located in Moscow. A creative solution to arranging the Olympic village in one of the new residential quarters of Moscow seems to have been found by chance. It was not included in the original project submitted to the IOC, but at a press conference held in May 1974, S. P. Pavlov, Chairman of Sportkomitet and head of the Steering Committee for the Moscow 1980 Olympic Games, first expressed the idea of using new housing developments for this purpose. Later, this idea was implemented with the residential quarters that included eighteen 16-storey buildings, with a directorate, restaurant, sports centre and other amenities being built in the south-western district of Moscow. As yet, no documents containing information about the distribution of this new housing stock amongst Moscow citizens after the Olympic Games have been located.

Alongside construction work, the Organizing Committee, jointly with international sport federations, also planned the detailed programme of sport competitions, conferences and meetings relating to certain kinds of sport, and a cultural programme for officials, sportsmen and

tourists. A particular item to be discussed was arranging for religious services in the Olympic village. With specific reference to the experience of previous Olympic Games, it was decided to equip three premises – for Christians, Muslims and Jews (with Buddhists). The decision to provide such a service arose from the desire to refute Western press statements that the USSR did not guarantee freedom of religion (Pyat' kolets 2011: 409–415).

A considerable amount of attention was paid to service sector management (catering, transport, trade) because this aspect of Soviet life was also subject to criticism in the foreign mass media. The issues discussed included not only the construction of new restaurants and stores, but also additional training of personnel. Later, during and after the Olympic Games, Soviet civil servants and the press actively used interviews with foreign tourists to prove that the accusations of the Western press were unsubstantiated (Pyat' kolets 2011: 796–799).

The international relations context and the boycott

The crisis resulting from the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops substantially altered the context in which preparations for the Moscow Olympics took place. By the end of 1979, progress reports prompted some anxiety, but generally speaking, both the IOC and the Soviet leadership were satisfied. However, events that occurred in the winter and spring of 1979/1980 brought many new problems. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which began on 27 December 1979 gave an additional impetus, or perhaps simply provided more ammunition for the government of the USA and some other countries to increase protests about holding the Olympic Games in Moscow. On 1 January 1980, at a meeting of NATO countries, the governments of the USA, the UK and Canada spoke in favour of boycotting the Moscow Games. This suggestion was sent to the IOC, while the USSR was delivered an ultimatum for immediate troop withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The situation was aggravated by the fact that these events took place before the opening of the Winter Olympic Games in Lake Placid, USA, and the USSR did not intend to forfeit its participation. At the eighty-second session of the IOC, the issue was put to a vote, and Moscow retained its right to hold the XXII Summer Olympic Games after a unanimous decision. Under pressure from U.S. President Carter, however, the American administration announced its refusal for the U.S. team to take part in the Games (Aronoff 2006). In March 1980, the USA suspended all trading transactions with the USSR, thus creating tremendous difficulties for the local Organizing Committee of the Olympics. Payments under contracts with ABC and Coca Cola were suspended, other imported goods from the USA were not supplied to the host city, and the USA stopped selling tickets for events and souvenirs. With other countries joining the boycott, the USSR faced similar problems with them. The CPSU Central Committee made a series of decisions aimed at improving the situation; propaganda via embassies and other information channels was enhanced. Upon agreement with the IOC, it was announced to all sportsmen that they were guaranteed the possibility of participating in the competitions, in circumvention of the boycott, under the Olympic flag instead of a national one. Furthermore, tourists from the USSR and other socialist countries were tempted with partial compensation for travel and accommodation expenses. According to all documents produced during this stage of preparation for the 1980 Olympic Games, the main task of the Central Committee was to prevent the USA and other countries that joined the boycott from fatally sabotaging all of the efforts that had already been made. The key idea to emerge from these documents was that the Olympic Games were certain to take place, and that everything must be taken to the highest level. It is most likely that, during this period, considerations of profit-making from holding the mega-event were no longer a focus of attention.

All efforts were put into counter-propaganda, in the course of which the reasons for boycott were replaced with the claim that the USSR was fighting for world peace, while the USA was pursuing an aggressive international policy aimed at ruining the first ever Soviet Olympic Games. New awareness-building and propaganda materials for Soviet and international audiences, including posters, films, cartoons and books, were created at an accelerated pace. Other activities that took place simultaneously included engaging the participation of athletes and spectators to the largest extent possible and explanatory work with the countries that were still uncertain about their attitude to the proposed boycott (Pyat' kolets 2011: 602–609, 614–619, 644, 647–656). In the end, the Moscow Olympic Games were boycotted by 65 countries, with 81 countries participating in the opening ceremony (Liberia refused to take part in the competitions but only joined the boycott after the opening ceremony). In a very short time, the Organizing Committee managed to get spectators to the stadiums to replace the tourists who had failed to come from the boycotting countries. All competitions were held in accordance with the schedule, and the Olympic Games were considered to be successful by both the USSR government and the IOC.

Conclusion

So what were the possible profits and losses of the USSR hosting this mega-event? On the one hand, one can suggest that the fact that South Korea, Chile, Israel and some other countries joined the boycott turned out to be a relief for the CPSU Central Committee, as this meant that there was no need to invite representatives of these countries. However, in addition to the competitions as such, during the Olympic Games important meetings of the IOC and international sport federations were held, at which representatives of many of these countries wanted to be present. In addition, journalists from these countries also applied for accreditation, and in compliance with IOC rules, the USSR had no right to refuse them. Therefore, one can argue that the 1980 Olympic Games did not in any way improve, but on the contrary, aggravated the difficulties that the USSR faced in the international relations.

With the need to urgently resolve issues related to filling the stadium seats, the inadequate deliveries of products and equipment, breaches of contracts for broadcasting rights and so on, the costs of the Olympic Games increased. Necessary security measures resulted in the almost complete destruction of civil rights movements inside the country, which met the interests of the CPSU Central Committee but did not make the internal situation easier for the country's citizens.

One of the positive consequences of the Moscow Olympic Games one should mention is that the USSR, having shown steadiness and confidence in its own position, had not turned out to be a defeated party in the eyes of the international community. Anti-Soviet and anti-capitalist propagandas counter-balanced each other, and the opposing parties broke even, especially given that the USA also suffered economic losses.

In addition, an openness and willingness to cooperate in the course of preparing for and holding the Olympic Games had been demonstrated, which, for a short time, increased 'iron curtain' transparency at least by way of trade relations. Another notable enhancement was that in the infrastructure of Moscow (with smaller changes in Leningrad, Tallin, and other cities that hosted individual Olympic Games competitions) – repaired roads, new cafes and restaurants, and a new residential district emerged. The short-term effects of the Olympic Games also included service improvement and an increased product range in Moscow stores.

Due to active counter-propaganda and the policy of deliberately silencing unfavourable facts, the USSR had also updated the image of the foreign enemy, whilst an image of the Moscow Olympic Games as the most peaceful, safe and friendly Olympic Games was created. Today this image continues to dominate the construction of memories of the Soviet mega-event. These propaganda activities and the use of the Olympic Games' image persisted long after the Games were over, and to some extent still persist (Gonitel 1981; Kolodnyi 1981; Guskov 1982; Samaranch 2001).

During the Cold War, capitalist and Soviet sport management systems were affected by each other, such that they increasingly acquired more common features. Analysis of sport and sport management, both in specific countries and in the overall international context, helps us to understand relations of power in the society since sport is a field of production, reproduction and transformation of cultural practice, ideology and religious faiths (Hargreaves 1982: 37). Mega-events such as the Olympic Games reveal a disposition of forces within the field of sports and, in the case of the subject under discussion, in the field of international politics in the second half of the twentieth century. The main participants in the Cold War, the USSR and the USA, accused each other of having ambitions of the world domination and hegemony. However, in terms of the political manoeuvring that took place around the 1980 Olympic Games in order to gain victory over the Cold War opponent, the match ended in a tie, despite the home-ground advantage of the USSR.

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POLITICS AND SPORTING EVENTS

Beijing Olympics, 2008

Dong Jinxia

The Olympic Games and politics have long been linked. This is especially true of the 2008 Olympic Games staged in Beijing, the capital city of People's Republic of China. The Games attracted over 10,000 athletes, over 50,000 media personnel, hundreds of thousands of tourists, a million volunteers and over four billion TV viewers across the world, which put China at the centre of world attention. The highlights of the successful bid, the eye-catching art airport terminal and stadiums, and the spectacular Opening and Closing ceremonies as well as the incidents during the Olympic torch relay on some European and North American legs made the Games one of the most politicized events in recent history. Arguably the Games might 'have far more influence than any other Games in history' (Penn 2008: 80–81).

Though the Games have been over for eight years, their impact is still felt in China and perhaps the world as well. In the past decade and more, a number of books and articles targeting Games-related issues such as national identity, foreign policy, media freedom, sports investment and so on have been published. Although some works targeted the political aspects of the Games, such as *Beijing's Games: What the Olympics Mean to China*, by Brownell, S. (2008); *Beijing 2008: Preparing for Glory: Chinese Challenge in the 'Chinese Century'*, by J. A. Mangan and Dong Jinxia (2009); 'The Beijing Games in the Western Imagination of China: The Weak Power of Soft Power', by Wolfram Manzenreiter (2008), very few examined the Beijing Games from a comprehensively political and historic perspective and its impact on today's China. Some issues still need to be examined. What made the Games more of a political event? What is the complex inter-relationship between the Beijing Games, identity politics and the modernization drive of China? What impact did the Games have on China's rise and on world affairs? This chapter explores the interconnections of the Beijing Games, domestic and international politics and modernization drive; it analyses the impact of the 2008 Games on implementing China's grand strategy of modernizing the nation and reviving its influential status in the world, and foresees the future development of the Olympic Movement in China.

Awakening China: Olympic bids

In 1991, Beijing submitted its first application to the IOC for the 2000 Olympic Games. This event turned world attention towards China, the awakening East-Asian giant. Why did